Improvements to the Theft Detection Incentive Scheme (TDIS)
Summary
This Change proposes that not only Confirmed Energy Thefts are incentivised within the Theft Detection Incentive Scheme (TDIS) but also Energy Theft Desktop and Site Visit Investigations.
Latest update and next planned activity
Date of latest update
Latest Update
22/09/25 - This Change Proposal has been implemented as part of the MHHS M8 22 September 2025 REC Release.
Impacts Overview
Impacted REC Parties and Market Participants
Energy Supplier (ES)
Impacted REC Documents
Schedule 1 - Interpretations and Definitions
Schedule 7 - Energy Theft Reduction
Solution development
Problem Statement
Suppliers are not currently meeting their TDIS Theft targets within each TDIS Reporting Year because there may be financial disincentives to undertake investigations where there is no assurance that such investigations would convert into a Confirmed Energy Theft.
Solution documents
Documents Library
05 Jun 2026
Download R0173 Final Change Report (Post-vote)
Change Plan
Party Impact Assessment Closure
Completed
Start:
20 May 2024Due:
04 Oct 2024Completion:
04 Oct 2024Consultation
In Progress
Start:
04 Oct 2024Due:
18 Oct 2024Completion:
18 Oct 2024Consultation Closure
Not Started
Start:
18 Oct 2024Due:
08 Nov 2024Completion:
Responsible Committee Decision
Not Started
Start:
08 Nov 2024Due:
03 Dec 2024Completion:
Send to Authority
Not Started
Start:
03 Dec 2024Due:
04 Dec 2024Completion:
Original submission
Change details
Samantha Briggs - REC Code Manager
20 May 2024
Change details
Improvements to the Theft Detection Incentive Scheme (TDIS)
The TDIS exists to incentivise Suppliers to resolve Energy Theft. The current TDIS was inherited from legacy codes and has proved challenging for impacted Parties. The following challenges have been identified.
- It has a complex methodology
- It results in unpredictable outcomes
- The debits/credits payable are dependent on the relative performance of each Supplier
- The determination of credits and debits is not directly linked to theft targets
- The value per theft varies dependent on overall market performance
- Scheme participants can "buy-out" of the scheme
- It only rewards confirmed thefts
- It assumes theft is evenly distributed - The scheme pot of funds is never fully distributed - Results are skewed for smaller parties
- It has a complex methodology
- It results in unpredictable outcomes
- The debits/credits payable are dependent on the relative performance of each Supplier
- The determination of credits and debits is not directly linked to theft targets
- The value per theft varies dependent on overall market performance
- Scheme participants can "buy-out" of the scheme
- It only rewards confirmed thefts
- It assumes theft is evenly distributed - The scheme pot of funds is never fully distributed - Results are skewed for smaller parties
It has been identified that the scheme design is too complex for Suppliers and is not effectively incentivising theft investigations. In its November 2023 letter, Ofgem noted that the overall TDIS performance of Energy Suppliers had fallen short of TDIS targets over the last 2 years with confirmed thefts being around 40% of the aggregate theft target.
An effective solution would address each of the challenges identified within the above question.
This Issue will be discussed at the May, June and July Theft Issues Group with the intention to have a refined solution to be consulted on in September 2024.
Impacts
Electricity, Gas
Safety
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Schedule 7 - Energy Theft Reduction
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Energy Suppliers
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No details provided
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No
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Priority & timing
No
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Intention to have a refined solution to be assessed by industry in September 2024.
No
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